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When Rudolph Cleveringa defied the Nazi authorities to protest their 
firing of a Jewish colleague from Leiden University in November 
1940, he displayed unforgettable ‘civic courage’. In this lecture, 
Michael Ignatieff asks what it takes to display such courage. Is it a 
neurological-instinctual reaction? Is it a form of rational deduction 
from moral principles?
Ignatieff argues that civic courage should be understood as an act 
of the moral imagination: the ability to envision a future that will 
redeem and validate the lonely act. In this case, Cleveringa was able to 
act because he was able to imagine a future beyond tyranny. 
The lecture is an attempt to re-think civic courage as a certain way 
of imagining time. If this is the case, we should be asking ourselves 
whether, in our own time, we still possess the capacity to imagine a 
redemptive future. 
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Civil Courage and the Moral Imagination
At ten o’clock on the morning of November 26, 1940, six 
months into the Nazi occupation of Holland, a 46 year old 
father of three, the dean of Leiden University Law School, 
walked into a lecture hall awaiting a class on civil law from 
Professor E.M. Meijers and told the students that Meijers had 
been dismissed from his post for being Jewish. The dean, R.P. 
Cleveringa, read out the text of the Reichskommisar’s dismissal 
notice and, in his own words, “the icy grip of terrible silence” 
descended upon the lecture hall.
 
The dean might have stopped there, but instead he offered 
a laudatio to a man he considered a mentor and a friend. 
Cleveringa enumerated his academic achievements and praised 
him as one of the most distinguished professors of civil law in 
Europe. Then he said this of his colleague:1
It is this Dutchman, this noble and true son of our 
people, this man, this father to students, this scholar 
that the foreigner who now dominates us “relieves 
of his function”! I told you that I would not speak of 
my feelings: I will keep my word even though they 
threaten to burst like boiling lava through all the 
cracks which I feel at moments could open under the 
pressure in my head and heart.
In Holland, these words are justly famous. In their passion and 
decency, they spoke up for the connections - between citizens, 
scholars, human beings and friends - that the occupiers sought 
to rip apart. 
But Cleveringa had not finished. He reminded his students that 
the Dutch constitution forbade the exclusion of any citizen 
from public employment on grounds of race or religion. 
Furthermore, the Hague Convention respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land adopted in 1907, required an 
occupying power to respect the laws of the occupied country 
sauf empechement absolu. There was no empechement whatever. 
The dismissal was illegal under both Dutch and international 
law. 
The dean urged the students not to do anything foolish and to 
submit, as he had done, to force majeure. 
He concluded by telling them that the class would continue to 
be taught either by him or by his colleagues and that with faith 
and hope they would await the return of Meijers who one day, 
God willing, would return to his rightful place. 
Let me draw your attention to the significance of this quietly 
spoken concluding note. To say that Meijers would return 
pointed to a day when the occupiers would be gone and Dutch 
freedom would be restored. 
This evocation of a future in freedom helps explain why at the 
conclusion of the lecture, the words of the national anthem, 
the Wilhelmus, banned by the occupation authorities, spread 
from voice to voice through the hall and to the crowd listening 
in an overflow room.
Cleveringa left his lecture on the podium. A colleague picked 
it up and students re-typed copies through the night. Next day 
it was circulated to universities throughout Holland. In the 
following week a peaceful student strike began at Leiden, the 
first such demonstration in Nazi occupied Europe. In revenge, 
the occupation authorities closed the university.
After the lecture Cleveringa went home to his wife and three 
daughters. His suitcase was already packed and ready in the 
hall. They waited quietly for arrest, which came next day, at 
the hands of the Dutch police, acting under orders from the 
Germans. 
When the Germans interrogated him, they wanted to 
know whether he was Jewish. He said he wasn’t. Why, then, 
had he ‘angered’ the Nazi authorities? He said he had no 
desire to anger anyone. But hadn’t he provoked a political 
demonstration that ended with the singing of the banned 
anthem? He said he had no desire to provoke. He had merely 
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spoken up on an issue of principle: the Germans had no 
authority to dismiss a university professor. 
As punishment for his actions, Cleveringa spent from 
November 1940 to the summer of 1941 in the prison of 
Scheveningen, which also served as transit camp where Dutch 
Jews were soon to be assembled for deportation and eventual 
extermination. Cleveringa was not deported, but he was 
dismissed and while he received a pension, he was unable to 
teach at the university.2 He joined resistance movements with 
fellow colleagues and was imprisoned again from January 
to July 1944 at the transit camp of Vught. His colleague, Ben 
Telders, a prominent figure in the Dutch Liberal party, was 
arrested in 1940, confined in Vught and then deported to 
Germany and confined in Buchenwald. He was moved to 
Bergen Belsen and died of typhus shortly before the liberation 
in April 1945. 
As for E.M. Meijers, he was sent to Westerbork transit camp in 
Holland, then deported to Theresienstadt with his family, but 
managed to stay alive by working in the camp administration. 
He was released upon the collapse of Germany in May 1945 
and made his way back to Leiden, emaciated and weakened by 
his ordeal. In September 1945, he resumed teaching his class 
and did so until his death in 1954.
Cleveringa himself returned quietly to university work after 
the war and died in 1980. 
This university is right to commemorate the civil courage of 
this man. Without Leiden, it is safe to say, no Cleveringa. 
His speech embodied traditions that date back to the founding 
of the university by William of Orange in 1575 at the 
beginning of the Dutch revolt against the Spanish occupation. 
Leiden’s motto - “praesidium libertatis’ - bastion of liberty 
- affirms this community’s enduring understanding of the 
interdependence of academic and political freedom.3
This lecture is about the connection between civil courage 
and the moral imagination. In his great essay A Defence of 
Poetry, written in 1821, the poet Shelley wrote, “ the great 
instrument of moral good is the imagination”.4 I want to take 
this remark seriously and use Cleveringa’s example to explore 
the constitutive role of the imagination in making civil courage 
possible. 
Civil courage, the bravery of citizens and civilians, is different 
from the courage of soldiers on the battlefield. The ability to 
take risks with your life, the ability to endure and rise above 
pain and danger is a different courage from the kind that 
consists in defending a friend at the price of imprisonment and 
dismissal. 
Yet both civil and military courage are mysterious virtues, 
capable of surprising even those who display them. 
Courageous people will tell you that they did not know they 
had it ‘in them’. Courage is mysterious in another way. Military 
training seeks to teach courage under fire, yet it remains an 
unteachable virtue. You will only know what you are capable of 
when the situation arises and if your courage fails it can shame 
you for life. 
Cleveringa’s act was luminous but the light it casts is 
mysterious. We commemorate it because we wish it to serve as 
an example. But what exactly can we learn? 
In the very hall where Cleveringa gave his speech, I want to 
use his own words, taken from his memoirs and from the 
memories of those who were there, to try to understand how a 
single act of courage became possible. 
I want to put the imagination back at the center of both 
exceptional and ordinary moral lives.5 I will claim that it is how 
we imagine ourselves, then others, then time present, past and 
future, that enables us to understand moral dilemmas we face. 
None of this is a given; the facts do not speak for themselves. 
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We have to imagine a future audience for our acts because no 
such future necessarily exists: we will it into being. It is this 
imagined future that called Cleveringa to bear witness and it is 
this imagined tomorrow that calls us to do right today. 
Our moral judgment is an exercise in justification before 
others. We have to explain ourselves with reasons and 
see whether these reasons succeed or fail with them. Our 
conscience, I would argue, is a theatre whose seats we people 
with an audience of our choice. We go wrong in life if we stack 
the audience with those we know will approve, with a jury 
we know will acquit. We go right in life if we can justify our 
actions before an audience that is not capable of being swayed 
by our wish to be justified. One audience we cannot sway is in 
the future, imagined figures in our mind’s eye waiting to pass 
judgment. Because we cannot know what they will think of 
us, we attach special importance to their verdict. They are the 
impartial spectators of our moral life.6
I want to show how this metaphor of the theatre of the 
imagination helps us to understand how one brave man 
framed his choices and acted as he did. 
In taking this approach, I will compare it to two current ways 
of thinking about moral life. 
The first could be called the neurological-instinctive. 
This is the influential school of moral psychology that says, 
in effect, that moral judgment is the psychic result of a bio-
chemical process, a firing of neurons and synapses structured, 
over millennia, by evolutionary adaptation.7 This school of 
thought wants to capture how quick, how intuitive our moral 
judgments feels to us, how little our moral reactions appear 
to depend on a process of rational evaluation. To use Daniel 
Kahneman’s distinction between thinking fast and slow, when 
we make moral judgments, we think fast.8 Indeed the process 
hardly feels like thinking at all. We can of course be wrong, 
and when we are, we can correct thinking fast, with laborious, 
conscious thinking slow.
The neurological-instinctive model does capture the speed 
with which we make moral choices. It captures the profound 
interpenetration of reason and emotion in moral judgment 
and captures that sense of virtue being mysterious to us, of 
not knowing ‘we had it in us’. An emphasis on the intuitive, 
instinctive character of morality seems more psychologically 
realistic than those philosophical accounts that model our 
moral reasoning as if our minds were a calculator, testing the 
applicability of rules by deduction.9
Recent neuroscience has uncovered the physical processes in 
the brain that appear to generate moral behavior. We have 
learned, for example, that when patients are put through brain 
scans, we can see different areas of their brain light up when 
classical moral dilemmas are presented to them.10 What still 
remains unexplained is how chemical and biological processes 
in the brain are translated into intentions and actions. 
Going back to our primary example, what exactly would 
we learn were a neurologist to tell us that certain zones of 
Cleveringa’s brain were especially activated in the stressful 
weeks before his decision? Almost certainly they were. 
Presumably other brains at Leiden were similarly activated by 
the widely rumored news of the impending dismissal of Jewish 
professors. 
In the weeks before his action, Cleveringa records that he felt a 
physical pressure in his brain and a constant sense of stress that 
he had to release. If we can’t understand how these instinctual 
reactions, perhaps felt by many others, were translated into his 
specific actions, we have no account of the singularity of his 
ethical judgment. 
The central difficulty with neurological-instinctual theory 
is that it gives us a biological account of how our emotions 
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work that may explain aggregate and average behaviors in 
large groups, but fails to give us a story about what is surely 
distinctive about moral experience: that it is ours and ours 
alone. 
Neurological-instinctive theory holds, moreover, that moral 
patterns are hard-wired in the brain through a millennial 
process of environmental adaptation. Thus, we are wired 
to accord moral preferences to kith and kin over strangers; 
to be aggressive and defensive in relation to aliens; prone to 
favoritism, nepotism and other forms of ethical partiality to 
blood relatives and others whose well-being has survival value 
for us.11 
Environmental adaptation through natural selection also 
provides an account of how cultures of morality change 
through long epochs of time, in particular how ethical codes 
emerge to restrain forms of selfishness that will damage the 
group. We can explain the slow emergence of the idea of 
equality before the law, for example, as an adaptive solution to 
the tribe’s problem of adjudicating competing selfish interests 
for the sake of group cohesion and survival. It would seem 
that the most impressive achievements of human culture are 
precisely those that restrain selfish ethical partiality. 
The problem with Darwinian explanation, it seems to me, is 
that while it can explain slow change in the culture of ethics, it 
has more difficulty accounting for rapid change. 
If the first defining element of our moral life is that we 
experience it as our own, the second element is that we decide 
nowadays in a situation of almost constant moral upheaval.
Our supposedly hard-wired instincts change so rapidly that it 
is difficult to understand the changes we have lived through 
as Darwinian adaptation based on natural selection. From the 
1880’s to 1945, virulent anti-Semitism was a commonplace 
in some groups in European culture.12 In 2013, it is the 
delusion of a marginalized few. In 1960, it would have been 
relatively common in the American South to find whites 
physically repelled at the prospect of sharing toilet facilities 
with black Americans. Today, these feelings have vanished or 
at least disappeared from public expression. In 1960, many 
heterosexuals felt repulsion towards homosexuals. In 2013, 
these instincts are restricted to a minority. 
What appears to be instinctual, natural, tribal, hard-wired 
is susceptible to historical change in the short run and if so 
our deepest emotions respond to opinion, language, political 
campaigns and legislative change. But if this is so, we need 
a theory that would explain how change in moral language 
works its way into our synapses. 
My point is not to question that moral action is activated 
by instinctual reactions, but rather to question how, exactly, 
biochemical processes shape individual action, especially in 
the Cleveringa case. It would have been adaptive for him to 
stay silent, prudent to keep his head down, sensible to avoid 
confronting the issue. He acted against prudence, self-interest 
even his own survival. Can instinctive-neurological accounts 
give us a story of such singular decision-making and can these 
accounts explain how moral lives change? For we need to see 
Cleveringa as an agent of change, one of those individuals 
whose singular acts disgraced commonplace anti-Semitism 
forever. We are here, tonight, after all, because he - and others 
like him - succeeded in changing the culture of his time. 
If we are tribal beings, moreover, hard-wired to favor those 
close to us, how is it that our tribal feelings are so labile, so 
subject to variation? 
More basically which tribe do we think we belong to? Which 
tribe - religion, family, race, gender - determines our instincts?
In the dean’s decision, we see that, for him at least, nothing 
is instinctual. The question of loyalty and belonging is one 
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he must decide for himself. Should he think of himself as a 
Gentile and Meijers as a Jew? Or should he think of them both 
as Dutchmen, members of the university and fellow scholars 
of law? Only the Nazis and their Dutch sympathizers think the 
choice should be instinctual. 
It is not merely that he has to decide which tribe he belongs to. 
This is part of the still larger challenge of deciding who he is. 
The deciding moral self is not a given. Instinctual-neurological 
and rational-deductive models of judgment alike assume a 
stable, unencumbered self, but this takes for granted precisely 
what needs to be constituted.13 
The fact is that we are a mystery to ourselves and in moments 
of moral crisis, we ask: who, in this scene, do we wish to be? 
Whose values do we wish to enact? Moral action can serve as 
an affirmation of who we are, but it can also represent our 
wish to redeem ourselves in our own eyes and in the eyes of 
others. Our first act of the imagination is to settle on which 
character we will play in the moral drama. 
The decision to ban Meijers forces Cleveringa to decide who 
he wishes to be, in his own eyes and in the eyes of a watching 
audience. The person whose opinion matters most to him is 
his wife. He consults with her constantly. A close relationship 
like this is a moral theater in which our deepest sense of self-
worth is tied to their sense of who we truly are.14 We know 
from Cleveringa’s memoirs that he was only at peace with his 
decision when he knew that he could count on his wife’s full 
support. 
We also know that she came from a liberal Mennonite family.15 
This does not mean that specific religious doctrine determined 
their choice. While Cleveringa makes reference to God, he does 
not convey any sense that he secures any guidance from above. 
Yet there seems little doubt that Mennonite Protestantism plays 
a role in framing how he sees himself as a moral actor. He takes 
it as a fact of his situation that he must choose. The religious 
milieu of his house also tells him that the choice he makes will 
be with him for the rest of his life. Faith defines the ultimate 
temporal frame of his moral life as eternity.
The second place in which Cleveringa’s choice is framed is the 
university itself. Leiden has been his life. He has taught there 
for his entire career. His closest friends and colleagues are 
members of the community. His connection to Meijers is at 
once institutional and personal. He is Meijers’ former student, 
now colleague and his dean, indeed nominally his superior. 
Basic to Cleveringa’s self-understanding is that he belongs to a 
free university community. If ‘bastion of liberty’ is to have any 
meaning, it must be that the hiring, promotion and dismissal 
of professors, for example, should be based on teaching and 
scholarly ability not race. This is precisely what is at stake in 
the Meijers’ case. 
In October 1940, the Reichskommissar had forced all Dutch 
public servants, including university professors, to sign a 
declaration stating that they were Aryan or face dismissal. 
Cleveringa and Telders had objected - in private Cleveringa 
called the decision monstrous - and together they protested to 
the Dutch Supreme Court. To their immense disappointment 
the Court ruled the declaration constitutional. After this, 
seventeen of eighty one Leiden professors signed the Aryan 
declaration, including Cleveringa. 
His signature was a decisive catalyst to his ultimate action. 
Once he signed, weeks of guilt, doubt and rising inner pressure 
followed. 
The key issue, as Cleveringa came to see it, was not simply 
what he owed Meijers, but what he owed the institution at 
large. He was able to see this because he made his decision 
with his colleagues. The choice to address the students was 
jointly taken at a faculty meeting. Once taken Ben Telders 
immediately volunteered to speak, arguing that as he had 
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no wife or children he did not face the same pressures as 
the married faculty. At this point, after leaving the meeting 
to consult his wife, Cleveringa declared that as dean, the 
responsibility was his. 
Here we see two institutions - marriage and a university - 
framing moral duty. In this crucible, Cleveringa considered 
and rejected the idea that he should use the occasion of his 
speech merely to express human sympathy for Meijers:
[if] “I was to limit myself to a compassionate face and a 
compassionate word. This seems like a betrayal to me, I cannot 
be so passive, I need to seriously express myself. “
The issue at stake went beyond compassion to the very idea of 
justice that his institution and his country should live by. As he 
later recalled:
No criteria such as values, scholarship, merit, humanity or 
citizenship would be decisive or would count, except merely 
the Jewish descent. For our feeling, that was pure arbitrariness, 
a sinking into the darkness of our past, where from our people 
had already come; it went against everything we were used 
to here in the Netherlands, which was considered our most 
precious cultural trait.
His audience that November morning understood his deed 
in exactly the same way. When the students began singing 
the Wilhelmus, it was their way of acknowledging that he 
had defined everyone in the hall as citizens of a state under 
occupation and members of a community fighting for its 
freedom. 
Neurological-instinctual models of moral choice fail to 
accord a role to the moral imagination of both speaker and 
audience in framing the meaning they shared in the hall 
that morning. Moral instincts of this complex sort are not 
triggered, but constituted, brought to consciousness and then 
to action through the agency of historically created meanings 
bequeathed to individuals by their institutions. Yet even here, 
institutionally inherited meanings are not determinative. We 
need to leave a role for singular moral leadership in making 
these meanings come alive to an audience. 
If leadership articulates the moral tradition of a free 
institution, then we have an account of his actions that appears 
to return us to rational-deductive models of explanation. 
These have the advantage over the neurological-instinctive 
in according to cognition and hence to choice a determining 
role in moral decision-making; if cognition is involved, it can 
be singular, it can give us an account at the individual level 
of what decision making means; and if rational deduction is 
involved, it embraces language; once it embraces language and 
metaphor, it embraces historicity and change. We can begin to 
understand how moral actors reinterpret the rules over time.
Rational-deductive approaches reflect what philosophers 
think we ought to do when we face a moral dilemma. What 
they want us to do is to reason, to pare away the penumbra of 
extraneous circumstances, identify the relevant specifics and 
then methodically evaluate what we should do against two 
competing modes of moral evaluation: the consequentialist-
utilitarian or deontological-principle. 
Philosophers study how we make moral decisions by studying 
complex hypotheticals.16 These ‘trolley problems’ test the limits 
of consequential reasoning, when lives are on the line, and they 
illustrate the ongoing tension in our hearts and minds between 
deontological and consequentialist rationales for handling 
moral dilemmas. 
The question is whether most of us actually make moral 
choices as philosophers wish us to. Our life is not a trolley 
problem: it is not a cleaned-up hypothetical and, as cognitive 
psychologists point out, real-life decisions, involving real 
people trigger deep emotions that are inseparably implicated 
when we attempt to apply reason to our dilemmas. 
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When faced with real-life dilemmas we do not reason like 
philosophers and we do not reason like lawyers or judges 
either. The historian and philosopher Judith Shklar counseled 
against ‘legalism’ in our moral thinking, the tendency to think 
of moral conduct as a “matter of rule following and moral 
relationships. . .as duties and rights determined by rules”.17
If we return to the case in question and to the philosophers, 
neither utilitarianism or deontological Kantianism - these 
beautiful machines - seem to have been removed from their 
glass cases and pressed into service as the dean made up his 
mind. As Cleveringa said, later, recalling his state of mind:
I cannot say that I weighed everything with a cool mind; my 
heart and conscience called upon me quickly, decisively and 
intensely; it pounded into me several times; I felt tense, moved 
and under pressure, which I had to get rid of. 
Philosophers may see his decision as a deontological versus a 
consequentialist choice, but if so, it radically simplifies what 
was at stake for him. 
This is not to say he did not weigh consequences. He worried 
what would happen to his daughters if he were arrested and 
taken away, but what worried him even more was what they 
would think of him if he remained silent. In particular, he 
worried that if he did nothing and they survived him, they 
would live with a ‘tainted name’.
If this is consequentialist reasoning it is of a particular kind. It 
actually imagines a future in which his daughters survive him 
and the question is whether their name is honored. 
This is where we see, once again, the constitutive role of 
imagined futures in determining his choices. Let us pause 
here to appreciate how difficult it was, in November 1940, to 
imagine the future Cleveringa called to mind.
In November 1940 the Nazi occupation of Holland was only 
five months old. All of Europe lay at Hitler’s feet. Across 
the Channel, London was in ruins. Across the Atlantic, the 
Americans were still on the sidelines. On Europe’s Eastern 
frontier, the Russians still remained Hitler’s allies. From one 
end of Europe to the other, Nazis were proclaiming the birth of 
a Thousand Year Old Reich. 
 
Hence, it was not coercion alone that made Dutch people 
submit to occupied rule, but also the conviction that the Nazis 
owned and defined the future. In such a frame, resistance, 
needless to say, was useless. 
Accordingly, an undetermined percentage of the Dutch 
population, perhaps as many as 1 in 5, either sympathized with 
the German occupation or actually joined the NSB, the local 
Nazi party.18 They did so either because they were believers or 
opportunists. Either way, they assumed that the Thousand Year 
Reich was not a boast, but a plausible bet on the future.19 
This is why, I think, some Leiden professors sang the praises of 
German Kultur und Civilization, why the NSB mayor who was 
imposed on the town of Leiden in 1941 told colleagues that 
‘some sacrifice’ of university values was justifiable at this time 
‘of crisis of European culture’.20
In declaring publicly that Meijers would one day return, the 
dean declared his faith in a future that some of his countrymen 
believed in too, but most did not. 
To be able to imagine such a future, however, he had to feel the 
strength of a living past. This is why, no Leiden, no Cleveringa. 
For the auditorium, the hall in which he spoke, this very hall 
built in the late Middle Ages and used by the university since 
1581, had existed centuries before the German invasion. It was 
the place where the adolescent Hugo Grotius had learned his 
law. The very bricks and mortar of this place proclaimed: we 
survived the Spaniards. We will survive the Germans. 
10
Prof.dr. Michael Ignatieff
These halls would remain, Cleveringa could say to himself, and 
because they would, there will come a time when the usurpers 
would be gone, when the community would once again be able 
to define who belonged not by race but by scholarship. It is this 
imagined time future that calls forth his act of courage.
Not all ancient institutions speak to their members in the 
same way. If I have criticized neurological-instinctive models 
for reducing meaning to biology, I should not replace them 
with models in which history determines the conscience. 
Institutions are not determinative. In few other ancient 
universities anywhere in Europe did deans and professors 
stand up for Jewish colleagues. In the University of Berlin, for 
example, Carl Schmitt, Nazi theorist, spent a pleasant 1930’s, 
happy that Jewish colleagues had been driven into exile, 
believing in the future Hitler wanted to create for Europe.21 
There is never any certainty that the traditions in a community 
of learning will call forth the best in people. In Leiden, this 
happened to be the case and it is a matter of sorrow - and 
perplexity - that other intellectuals failed to see that if the 
institutions they served had survived earlier tyrannies it would 
survive this one. But this is what Leiden’s walls seemed to say 
to the dean. 
Cleveringa’s faith is what the American philosopher Jonathan 
Lear has called ‘radical hope’.22 The hope is radical because it 
requires a sustained imaginative projection of faith beyond a 
desperate present. 
Radical hope is something more than optimistic hopefulness, 
something more than Mr. Micawber’s belief that something is 
bound to turn up. It is not an individualized conviction, but 
rather a belief in a collective future that will redeem a blighted 
present. Most frequently it takes the form of a political 
ideology or creed. For nearly 150 years in Europe, for example, 
Communists fought and died in the name of a ‘radiant 
tomorrow’ laying down their own lives, but also sacrificing 
millions of others for the construction of some socialist 
paradise that receded inexorably with every step they took 
towards it. Cleveringa’s faith, needless to say, was of a different 
order. His faith that Meijers would return did not depend 
upon any political ideology we can detect. It was simply the 
modest faith that loyalty, scholarship and ties of citizenship 
would prevail over murderous opportunism in a Holland that 
one day would see the back of the occupiers.
In 1940 and 1941, radical hope was in short supply in Europe, 
but it was present, in some of the darkest places, in the 
prison yards of occupied France, for example, where young 
resistants were taken out to be shot. We know, from those 
who heard them in nearby cells, that some called out Vive la 
France! before they fell. These words were more than patriotic 
defiance. In their temporal dimension, they affirmed faith in a 
France of tomorrow that would remember their sacrifice. 
I would also cite the case of Primo Levi in Auschwitz in late 
1944 circling the exercise yard with a fellow prisoner, clad 
in filthy rags, ill with fever, struggling to recall some lines 
from Dante. When they finally remember the lines, Levi later 
recalled, they felt overwhelmed, as if a trumpet had sounded in 
the darkness: 
 Consider your seed:
You were not made to live like brutes
 But to follow virtue and knowledge.
In recalling these lines to memory, it was as if the prisoners had 
succeeded in transporting themselves, if only for one moment, 
into the future, into a world in which people could freely 
exchange lines of poetry. This imagined future rekindled their 
longing to live, to endure and to survive. 
We now live in this future, and so we should ask ourselves what 
we must do to be worthy of their example. If the university 
made Cleveringa’s act of solidarity possible, can we be certain 
that universities today remain capable of the same? Does the 
university still function as a moral community, capable of 
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standing up for its members when their freedom and dignity 
are challenged? We will not know the answer till the challenge 
arises. All we know is that this place did function as a moral 
community in November 1940.23 
Moving beyond this community, what right does Dutch society 
have to claim Cleveringa’s legacy? Here we have to face the 
reality - well known to all of you - that eighty percent of the 
Dutch Jews, citizens of this country, perished in the Holocaust, 
a higher percentage than anywhere in Europe other than 
Germany and Poland.24 There are many possible explanations 
of this fact: the particularly violent character of Nazi rule 
in Holland, but also the strength of the Dutch Nazi Party 
and the willingness of Dutch administrators to facilitate the 
deportation and murder of their fellow citizens.25
Evidently, not all Dutch people of that generation behaved in 
the same way. We know this because the percentage of Jews 
saved in Holland varied markedly from place to place. In some 
cases, citizens hid and saved their fellow citizens and in Leiden 
for example, 50 percent of the Jews survived the war; in other 
famous cases, Amsterdam dock workers went on strike to 
protest the rounding up of Jews; in other cases, however, the 
moral reality was darker. 
We can only conclude that in this country and many parts of 
occupied Europe, common bonds of citizenship turned out to 
be too weak to stand up to the barbarism of Nazi rule. Once 
citizenship no longer proved strong enough to protect the Jews, 
did common humanity step into the breach? In some cases 
yes. Pity, compassion and empathy did inspire acts of rescue. 
Unfortunately this was the exception, not the rule. When Jews 
were stripped of citizenship, expelled from communities, when 
they were forced to wear the yellow star, when they could only 
appeal for compassion to their fellow human beings, it was 
too late. Jews across Europe were to discover the bitter truth in 
Hannah Arendt’s words, written in 1948:26
It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has 
lost the very qualities that make it possible for other 
people to treat him as a fellow man.
We must acknowledge the difficult fact that human rights 
alone cannot protect the vulnerable. Their protection depends 
more on securing rights of citizenship, membership bonds 
in strong communities, neighborly ties and friendship too.27 
When these ties are absent, shared recognition of common 
humanity is weak. Meijers was defended because he was a 
professor and a member of a community proud enough of 
itself to rise in his defense. 
There are lessons we can draw from the courage displayed here 
one November night in 1940. We must strengthen institutions 
so that we accept a common obligation to stand up for each 
other, extend citizenship so all shelter under equal rights; be 
unbending in ensuring that the rule of law applies to all; and 
we must have the imagination to understand that fascism is 
never securely in the past. Indeed, terror can be incubated in 
democracy. We should fight constantly against the besetting 
sin of democratic politics: demagogues who trade on prejudice 
and fear and seek to rally ‘us’ against a supposed ‘them’. 
Once people are lawfully within our borders, whether as 
citizens, visitors or guest, we must affirm: they are part of us. 
There is no them.28
Goodness is fragile, a philosopher once said.29 Cleveringa’s 
example is respected best when we acknowledge how rare it 
was. We should ask ourselves whether we have the capacity to 
believe so fervently in a better future that we make it our judge. 
Since we know that such imagining is hard, the truest way to 
honor Cleveringa tonight is to leave this hall, asking, with a 
troubled heart, whether we would be capable of what he did, 
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Civil Courage and the Moral Imagination
Bij ons leer je de wereld kennen
Prof.dr. Michael Ignatieff
When Rudolph Cleveringa defied the Nazi authorities to protest their 
firing of a Jewish colleague from Leiden University in November 
1940, he displayed unforgettable ‘civic courage’. In this lecture, 
Michael Ignatieff asks what it takes to display such courage. Is it a 
neurological-instinctual reaction? Is it a form of rational deduction 
from moral principles?
Ignatieff argues that civic courage should be understood as an act 
of the moral imagination: the ability to envision a future that will 
redeem and validate the lonely act. In this case, Cleveringa was able to 
act because he was able to imagine a future beyond tyranny. 
The lecture is an attempt to re-think civic courage as a certain way 
of imagining time. If this is the case, we should be asking ourselves 
whether, in our own time, we still possess the capacity to imagine a 
redemptive future. 
